When I led U.S. European Command from 2009 to 2013, Israel and the Levant were part of my geographic area of responsibility. I often went to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, the West Bank and, yes, the Gaza Strip. It was a daunting part of my remit, and I sought advice from a longtime mentor: Henry Kissinger, who knew a thing or two about the Middle East.

He gave me a great deal of advice, but one thing he said has really stuck with me — and I think is very much of the moment. “The key to understanding the Middle East,” he said, “is understanding and accepting that every solution is merely the admission ticket to the next problem.”

Even as President Donald Trump takes a deserved victory lap for working out a ceasefire and hostage release, he and his team need to bear that maxim in mind.

Do the U.S., and its allies from the Arab world and Europe, have the required determination to buy that admission ticket and help implement the tenuous ceasefire? Are they willing to offer the required assistance — perhaps including blood and treasure — to help forge a permanent peace?

Trump has been clear that he is not enthusiastic about overseas troop deployments in general, and the use of U.S. boots on the ground in Gaza may be a bridge too far. But there are lots of options for Pentagon planners short of that.

Step one is actually not in Gaza, but at the U.S. Embassy and consular posts in Israel. While the embassy in Jerusalem has a contingent of U.S. troops assigned to it — for protection and to liaison with the Israelis and Palestinians — that force needs to be significantly increased for a potential operational surge. Adding a new diplomatic Joint Task Force (JTF), led by a one-star foreign-affairs officer and under the authority of Ambassador Mike Huckabee, would make sense. Sending five additional expert planners, one from each of the Pentagon’s services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines and Space Force), and a couple of dozen supporting senior enlisted troops would be a good complement.

Similarly, the in-country U.S. security coordinator, a three-star lieutenant general posting, will need reinforcements. That team’s mission is to provide cooperation and communications between the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF) in the West Bank and the Israel Defense Forces. The Palestinian Authority is already indicating readiness to take on tasks in Gaza, including operating the crucial Rafah gate crossing.

Since elements of the PASF will presumably have a central role in any Gaza peacekeeping mission, increased coordination with the IDF will be required, despite the current high tensions. Thus the addition of several dozen U.S. mid-grade officers as trainers seems prudent. Canada already contributes troops to the security-coordination team and could send more.

Additionally, the U.S. intelligence agencies (Central Intelligence Agency, FBI overseas teams, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Justice Department and others) should each send at least one top analyst for monitoring and providing early warning of backsliding by Hamas, which is all too predictable.

For increased force protection, the Pentagon can deploy Marine Fleet Antiterrorism Security Teams, or FASTs, made up of several hundred Marines in half a dozen platoons. Whenever a crisis loomed in the region during my years at Central Command, I deployed the FAST teams, including in Libya when the war there ramped up in the early 2010s. These are elite groups prepared to “snap in” with embassy security forces. At least two FAST teams should be headed into theater now, one to be based in Jerusalem, the other in Tel Aviv.

Now we come to the really hard part: What will be the role of U.S. forces in Gaza itself? Expect caution. The bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon 1n 1983, which killed 231 service members, will never be forgotten at the Pentagon.

A prudent deployment could be one Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) embarked in an Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG). This would consist of three to six warships, several thousand Marines and sailors, a couple of dozen helicopters, significant logistical and medical capabilities, and missile defense provided by one to three Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers. (Coincidentally, this is essentially the U.S. force off the coast of Venezuela right now.)

An MEU is a powerful commitment of capability and, best of all, it doesn’t need a base ashore: It can operate in international waters of the Mediterranean, and in a crisis the warships could pull into Israeli ports. Thus, even if the U.S. doesn’t want on-the-ground forces in the Gaza Strip, these Marines could provide significant assistance to the putative international peacekeeping force.

Overall, the U.S. support contingent would consist of about 5,000 sailors and Marines, and a few hundred additional Army soldiers ashore, all answering to the task-force commander afloat in a large-deck amphibious warship.

This wide array of interests would hammer out the structure of the international security force, which will likely report to the “Gaza Board of Peace” envisioned in Trump’s 20-point peace plan. I could see a division of labor in which the IDF keeps 30,000 or so troops in the half of Gaza it now controls, while Palestinian Authority forces become the spearhead of a multinational Arab contingent with the unenviable task of subduing the militant remnants of Hamas.

For the latter, controlling the southern half of Gaza, disarming Hamas bitter-enders and providing humanitarian aid and medical support — all while putting into motion the first steps of reconstruction — will be a Herculean task. The Arab force should be under command of a three-star general from one of the nations involved, and will need to consist of at least 30,000 troops to have any chance of truly cutting off Hamas. The public executions conducted recently by the terrorist group certainly don’t show an organization willing to go out gently.

As Trump said of Hamas, “If they don’t disarm, we will disarm them.” Good. But it’s a tough ticket: Doing so will require a big lift from the U.S. military, and an even bigger one from Arab partners and other allies. But it represents the only possible path to peace in the region.

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Stavridis is dean emeritus of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He is on the boards of Aon, Fortinet and Ankura Consulting Group.

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This column reflects the personal views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.

James Stavridis is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist, a retired U.S. Navy admiral, former supreme allied commander of NATO, and vice chairman of global affairs at the Carlyle Group.

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