Last week, a massive commercial vessel was hijacked 620 nautical miles off the coast of Somalia. Formally flagged to Malta, the Hellas Aphrodite is a Greek-owned tanker that was carrying gasoline from India to South Africa — a transit through dangerous waters off Africa’s eastern coast.

Fortunately, a European Union mission focused on counter-piracy, Operation Atalanta, was able to dispatch a Spanish frigate that sent special forces aboard and freed the crew of 24. The pirates escaped and are likely to strike again, given the poverty and chaos ashore in war-torn Somalia.

This was not an isolated incident. Pirates successfully seized another ship last spring, 400 miles off the coast of Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital. Over the course of 2024, seven pirate attacks were reported. There have also been close calls, including one within hours of the Hellas Aphrodite assault; that ship managed to outrun its attackers. Lately, the pirates have also been hunting smaller prey like fishing boats.

These incidents rattle old ghosts for me. I spent four years in constant combat with Somali pirates when I served as supreme allied commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In 2011, we saw nearly 250 attacks on merchant shipping, with hundreds of mariners held hostage. NATO, the EU and a number of other nations — including, somewhat surprisingly, Russia, China and Iran — cooperated to suppress the robbery at sea.

Those pirates showed a lot of determination and tactical acumen. They can range well over 500 nautical miles at sea using “mother ships,” often large dhows, then launching smaller skiffs at the targeted ships. The film Captain Phillips, which depicted the hijacking of the Maersk Alabama, gave an accurate portrait of the pirates. They are most often athletic teenagers, armed with AK-47 automatic rifles and shoulder-fired rockets, who use light boarding ladders to climb the high sides of the tankers.

Once pirates are aboard, the crew has few options. They are not trained or armed, and are generally instructed to surrender or, at best, barricade themselves in “safe rooms” and radio for help. The pirates will then negotiate the release of the ship, sailors and cargo for a price, usually in the millions of dollars, often paid in cryptocurrency into offshore bank accounts.

What can be done to avoid a return to the chaos of the early 2010s?

While some may think there is nothing admirals enjoy more than chasing pirates, there is nothing fun about it. The counter-piracy mission was a major drain on attention and resources. I wanted to keep NATO focused on Afghanistan, Iraq, the Balkans and the sudden war in Libya in 2011. But the disrupted supply chains and the humanitarian crisis of mariners held hostage by pirates demanded action. And we were victorious, with nary a successful attack for a decade.

Our triumph relied on a three-pronged approach. First, counter-piracy is a team effort. If Somali pirate assaults rise to the level of 15 years ago, not only should NATO, the EU and African and Arab nations be involved, but we should approach Iran (which has excellent maritime intelligence) and China, which desperately needs the oil transiting the region. (Vladimir Putin’s Russia, of course, is no longer a viable partner.)

A second key element is working with the shipping industry. We accomplished this in part by engaging with the International Maritime Organization, a United Nations agency with headquarters in London. The IMO has nearly 180 member nations, including the U.S., and focuses on maritime transit and enforcing the Law of the Sea Treaty. It can help organize convoys that provide mutual support; push ships to embark armed security details from private firms; and provide coordination between the tankers and international military operations like Operation Atalanta.

Third, solving the problem of piracy through sea operations is a mug’s game. The only lasting solutions lie ashore. The first step would be tactical military enforcement — sending armed special forces and Marines ashore to destroy the pirates’ maintenance facilities; break up logistic chains for their fuel and ammunition; and capture pirate leadership. Over the longer term, we must work with development agencies and local communities to provide better economic conditions — creating jobs as alternatives to piracy.

Finally, a cautionary word: Blowing up suspected pirate boats off the coast of Somalia to deter piracy is illegal and inhumane. The right approach is to use a law-enforcement framework to defend the merchant ships and capture pirates when possible. While Somalia itself has little capability, neighboring Kenya has been helpful in prosecuting captured pirates. Djibouti, the tiny country at the Horn of Africa, where the U.S. maintains a military base, could help. Saudi Arabia, with its extensive Red Sea coast and capable navy, might be willing to engage.

As so often is the case in creating global security, the keys are working with allies, partners and friends; enhancing private-public cooperation; and digging into the root causes of problems. Otherwise, the pirates of Somalia may terrorize the seas again.

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Stavridis is dean emeritus of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He is on the boards of Aon, Fortinet and Ankura Consulting Group.

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This column reflects the personal views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.

James Stavridis is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist, a retired U.S. Navy admiral, former supreme allied commander of NATO, and vice chairman of global affairs at the Carlyle Group.

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