The capture of Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro in the heart of Caracas last month served multiple purposes for Donald Trump. First, the operation nabbed a man who was a long-time irritant to U.S. interests in Latin America. Second, it demonstrated to other regional leaders what could happen if they refused to meet President Trump’s policy demands. And third, taking Maduro off the board was a force-multiplier for the administration’s Cuba policy, which centers on increasing economic pressure on the island until its aging rulers either wither away or negotiate their own demise.

For some in the administration, the downfall of Cuba’s communist regime would be like a 5-year-old waking up to a mountain of presents on Christmas morning. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, whose parents left Cuba a few years before Fidel Castro took power, has eyed the regime in Havana as one of the world’s most pernicious, inhumane and troublesome. Trump couldn’t care less about human rights or transplanting democracy on the island, but he does care about wielding power and slaying enemies, real and perceived, to build up his legacy. Given its historical significance, overthrowing the Cuban regime would be at the very top of the list — a feat that all of his predecessors since Dwight D. Eisenhower failed to do.

On the other side of the ledger stands a small, weak country 90 miles off South Florida whose only redeeming quality is the enterprising spirit of its people. Miguel Díaz-Canel, who took over the Cuban presidency from Raúl Castro in 2018, is presiding over Cuba’s worst series of crises since the so-called “special period” of the early to mid-1990s, when the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuba’s major benefactor, led to widespread rationing. The COVID-19 pandemic, coupled with the six-decade-long U.S. trade embargo and more U.S. sanctions on the island, has squeezed Cuba’s finances to the last handful of pennies.

Even the Cuban government, experts on propaganda, can’t hide it anymore. Last summer, the island’s economy minister said that the Cuban economy contracted by 10% since 2019. Tourism, one of Cuba’s major moneymakers, is down by 70% since 2018. Foreign visitors simply don’t want to travel to Cuba if it means their U.S. visas could get tied up in bureaucratic purgatory. The same goes for companies that would ordinarily view Cuba as a lucrative investment opportunity; why risk getting fined, prosecuted by the U.S. Justice Department or shut out of the much larger U.S. market when you could just play it safe?

The only thing worse than Cuba’s economy is its energy outlook. During the last quarter century of Chavismo in Venezuela, Cubans could depend on Caracas for a steady diet of crude oil at a highly subsidized rate. But with Maduro now sitting in a New York jailhouse and his former vice president, Delcy Rodríguez, trying to please the Trump administration with oil concessions, Venezuelan crude is no longer flowing to the island. Alternatives are few and far between. Russia’s crude exports to Cuba are sporadic, and Mexico, which has sent oil to Cuba on a humanitarian basis since the 1970s, is now getting pressured by the Trump administration to cut shipments. Cuba could run out of fuel in the next 15 to 20 days, which means that everything from garbage collection and hospital services to electricity generation could be disrupted.

To tighten the screws further, Trump signed an executive order last week instituting a tariff regime on any country that sells or supplies crude oil to Cuba. This presents another delicate balancing act for Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum, who needs to remain in Trump’s good graces while at the same time shielding herself from being seen as throwing Cuba under the bus. Failing to do the former could upend U.S.-Mexico relations on any number of fronts; failing to do the latter will get her into trouble with her party’s vocal far-left faction, which sees support for Cuba as an extension of anti-imperialism.

Trump, meanwhile, hasn’t given us a clue about what he aims to accomplish in Cuba. “It doesn’t have to be a humanitarian crisis,” Trump said over the weekend. “I think they (Cuba) would come to us and want to make a deal.”

But what kind of deal is Trump looking for? According to U.S. law, Washington seeks to accomplish a long list of idealistic goals in Cuba: the release of all political prisoners; the legalization of political activity; free and fair elections under international supervision; an independent judiciary; guaranteeing personal freedoms and rights like free speech and a free press; and a new constitution. Needless to say, the Cuban authorities aren’t interested in doing any of this, particularly if it dilutes their political power or threatens the regime’s durability. And while Trump may not busy himself with democracy promotion, it’s hard to believe the Cubans will be as amenable to U.S. subjugation as their former Venezuelan allies have been so far.

As I wrote in a recent paper, normalizing the U.S.-Cuba relationship would be the most effective and least costly policy proposal on the table. Cuba isn’t a real national security threat to the United States anyway, can’t possibly compete with U.S. primacy in the Western Hemisphere and at times has been willing to cooperate with Washington on issues ranging from migration to counter-narcotics. Regime change on the island has also fallen woefully short since 1959, when Castro chased the U.S.-backed dictator off the island.

Yet to expect Trump to embrace this recommendation is borderline delusional. And the Cuban people, suffering under extreme deprivation, will pay the ultimate price.

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Daniel DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a foreign affairs columnist for the Chicago Tribune.

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